Introduction
The international human rights regime has undergone extraordinary expansion in the last thirty years, evident in an increasingly sophisticated framework of treaties, networks, institutions, and ambitious standards. Now, widely regarded as a core component of interstate and transnational global affairs, few international relations (IR) scholars anticipated the contemporary reach of human rights. 1 The transformative potential of an increasingly intrusive human rights architecture should not be underestimated. However, concerns persist regarding the disjuncture between human rights system rules and practices on the ground.
This 'compliance gap' is exacerbated by the relative absence of implementation arrangements authorised to enforce a global human rights governance agenda.
The terms of this debate in IR reflect the limitations of a discipline which has only recently extended its gaze beyond interstate relations. IR scholars have struggled to accommodate multiple scales of actors, authority structures, and societal conditions into their explanatory frameworks. As such, human rights scholarship has only recently begun to deepen understanding of key empirical questions on governance in this issue-area. limitations. The instrumental account cannot fully explain governance outcomes, as it tends to privilege structural properties and instrumental rationales focused on resource competition, while screening out agency and political conflict. The relational account, with its emphasis on synergies and tensions, while instructive, does not necessarily translate into a specified analytical framework.
This article seeks to specify conceptually and theoretically a governance architecture from the global to the local level within an issue-specific governance domain. There remains a residual methodological nationalism in much of the IR literature, tending towards arbitrary segmentation of political arenas. 7 A particularly promising advance towards a unified theory of global governance can be found in the work of Abbott and colleagues on orchestration. 
Bridging gaps: global human rights governance
Global human rights governance bears the hallmarks of Rosenau's dictum on 'governance without government', 12 displaying multiplying forms and structures of authority, regime complexity, actor proliferation and, importantly, the capacity for transformation. States remain prominent within human rights governance. However, the exercise and effects of state power in this domain are undergoing significant change, informed by emergent forms of private and hybrid authority. This trend has been documented in a large body of interdisciplinary work offering micro and macro accounts of the origins of international human rights regimes and the gradual ceding of delegated authority by state parties to independent structures and agents. emerged or been strengthened since the early 1990s in the wake of an operational shift towards implementation at the national level. 25 In turn, there has been significant expansion of regional-level human rights regimes, most notably in Europe and Latin America, but also emergent in Africa and the Asia-Pacific. 26 However, governance relationships between the global and the local societal level have remained largely segmented, mediated by state authority and a selective group of transnational actors. As Zürn notes, there is a pressing need 'to legitimate decisions more directly in order to make the two-step authority relationship viable'. 27 The new OPCAT architecture described below represents an organisational response to this major deficit.
A focus on architecture to explore global human rights governance is intuitively appealing.
The language of design provides a sense of structure to often highly decentralised, loosely coupled realms of politics. From a functionalist perspective, architecture provides a platform upon which to build more effective and efficient governance arrangements. Guided by the concepts of subsidiarity (decisions should be made at as local a level as possible) and irreducibility (certain problems can only be addressed at the global level), rationalists emphasise the importance of limiting negative externalities of decentralised action, efficiency gains through coordination, and functional differentiation. 28 To achieve these objectives, they institutions and all of their component elements. 31 The approach adopted here reflects an interest in magnifying how governance rule-systems are purposively articulated within issuespecific domains. Architecture reflects not just legal form but also normative and political understandings and expectations. Rather than simply being the aggregation of formal rules and structure, it is also composed of political units with diverse interests. Close attention must therefore be given to how these political units are integrated. relationship between global structures and the intended beneficiaries (or governed), architecture must display a capacity to accommodate some form of deliberative politics among those political units which populate it. 36 As an illustration of this, social science research has focused upon the informational effects of international instruments at the domestic level. 37 However, less attention has been paid to the conditions under which informational content becomes salient. As Johnston puts it, there is a potential 'infinite regress problem' in establishing the credibility of information at or in any given place. 38 Explaining the local impact of information necessitates attention not only to its coordination, but also to the legitimate authority of the messenger(s) and its distributional implications for competing domestic political forces. The ability of global governors to steward governance processes in local contexts, especially those defined by high levels of rule contestation, will be reliant upon domestic pro-compliance coalitions which share their goals and are willing to engage in the often costly (sometimes dangerous) politics of social change. Evaluating the quality of governance relationships across political units within global governance architectures is therefore essential to understanding outcomes.
Orchestrating global human rights governance
In order to generate insight into the interplay of political units within a multi-scale governance architecture, this article employs orchestration theory. 39 Orchestration can be defined as when a governance actor (the orchestrator) enlists and supports third-party actors (the intermediary) to address (the target) indirectly in pursuit of shared governance objectives. As a theory, it displays a number of general application merits, specifying types of actors, their governance relationships, and the scope for governance mobilisation in light of prevailing problem structures and strategic environments.
Orchestration is particularly well-suited to the problem structure thrown up by human rights governance where significant autonomy and functions -short of enforcement authority -are delegated to independent agents. Why do states cede authority to formally autonomous human rights architecture offers both the means and opportunity to achieve this objective.
Orchestrating chains of governance in torture prevention
Scholars have produced valuable insight into the origins of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture regime. 40 However, the significance of this new class of treaty regime is still under-theorised and not well understood. Orchestration theory highlights the agentic elements of this unusually articulated architecture, while also making legible the chain of governance relationships from the global to the local.
Orchestration holds when three conditions are met: (1) the orchestrator seeks to influence the behaviour of the target via intermediaries, (2) the orchestrator does not exercise control over the intermediary, which, in turn, (3) cannot compel compliance of the target. 41 In contrast to hierarchy and delegation, this mode of governance is not premised on contractual obligation, but rather on voluntary participation within multi-actor systems. Orchestration identifies influence exercised indirectly via an intermediary. However, the orchestrator may also engage directly with the target simultaneous to exercising an orchestration strategy. As 
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The SPT is the OPCAT focal actor within UN structures charged with closing compliance gaps between global rule-authority and domestic rule-implementation. Nominally a subcommittee to the long-standing Committee Against Torture (CAT), 43 the SPT forms part of an integrated torture prevention regime but is more accurately understood as a free-standing monitoring body rather than as a subsidiary to the CAT. 44 The OPCAT seeks to imprint a proscriptive rule framework in a global system of inspection of places of detention coordinated by an international body of independent experts. Establishing no new norms or standards, OPCAT is instead focused on implementing a well-established normative framework prohibiting torture through innovative procedural obligations. 45 For the architects of OPCAT, the SPT forms the centre-piece of a novel legalisation of human rights architecture which obliges states to recognise the jurisdiction of a global monitoring structure, as well as an analogous domestic structure (Model A, Figure 1 ).
As a political unit, the SPT comprises 25 independent experts who are appointed by state parties to the Protocol, but serve in their personal capacity for a four-year term, once renewable. 46 In contrast to other treaty bodies, OPCAT seeks to limit state oversight by explicitly setting down independence and impartiality criteria for membership. 47 The
Convention also requires equitable geographical and gender representation on the subcommittee. 48 The vast majority of SPT members display significant expertise and are generally viewed as credible. 49 However, the presence of two current government officials on the SPT is cause for concern. 50 Perception of independence is vital to the legitimate authority of the SPT. It must guard against actual or perceived instrumentalization by state parties.
Countervailing background norms are also apparent in the final OPCAT text which may exert a conservative pull on the appropriate scope of SPT orchestration activities. obligations. In effect, the SPT exercises a police patrol form of accountability mandated to:
(1) establish a programme of regular visits, (2) choose the places it wants to visit, and (3) propose follow-up visits. 54 States are required to receive the SPT and grant it unrestricted access on its territory without prior consent. 55 This is a sea change from the oversight, subject to state consent, exercised by the CAT inquiry procedure or the UN independent expert or 'special procedure' on torture. 56 Whereas the authority of the CAT is located mainly in its rule-making function, that of the SPT can be traced to its rule-implementation prerogatives.
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As one observer puts it:
The promise of the SPT is that it is the largest UN human rights treaty body, which goes to the field and is part of an official system with a constellation of national bodies, given legitimacy by an international treaty.
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It is important to note that the SPT is the product of intergovernmental negotiation. This is Although empowered, subject to state cooperation, to conduct confidential inquiries into allegations of systematic torture, the CAT has carried out only eight such inquiries.
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Between 2007 and 2013, the SPT conducted nineteen country visits, with just ten states consenting to the resulting report being made public. Although the SPT conducts its work in 'a spirit of cooperation' with state authorities, cooperation has its limits.
As such, the SPT has motive to engage in orchestration activities. What of the means and opportunity? As noted above, the SPT forms part of a novel dual-level architecture and is expected to steward system-wide coordination. This is most visible in its formal linkages to National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs). While this relationship is formalised in the OPCAT architecture, it relies largely on goal alignment between both SPT and NPM. to designation and strengthening of NPMs. 65 The SPT has begun to assume a more proactive role, with its first advisory visit on OPCAT implementation conducted in Nigeria in April The SPT membership has shown itself willing to make modest moves away from a 'paternalistic' mode of governance towards a more horizontal and deliberative decisionmaking model conducive to system-wide orchestration. More could be done. Its credibility and performance, and that of the OPCAT architecture, may depend upon it.
B. The Intermediary
The NPM forms the second core pillar of the OPCAT architecture; the formal linkage of a global monitoring body with an equivalent domestic structure. The legal coupling of global and domestic mirror structures described here is a significant departure from treaty law precedent, with NPMs offering a gateway for ensuring consistency of rule system implementation across jurisdictions. Focusing on goal convergence between these two actors, we can construct a set of four orchestration outcomes (Figure 2) . In a simple orchestration model, the NPM serves as intermediary to the SPT and the OPCAT implementation programme. Simple orchestration relies upon goal convergence between the Orchestrator and Intermediary, with the Orchestrator no hierarchical control. The NPM also serves to mediate the deep governance level along a governance chain extending from the SPT to the sub-local level (Model B, Figure 1 ). This dispersal of delegated authority from an IGO to a national mechanism can empower the NPM to assume an orchestrator role in its own right. Indeed, NPMs are generally exhorted to be 'a leader' in torture prevention. 84 In a scenario of cascade orchestration, motivated local stakeholders not formally integrated into the OPCAT architecture may nevertheless advance goals consistent with its rule system, but absent formalised relations with the orchestrator.
Conclusion
The notion of architecture provides a valuable way into identifying not only what is actually global in global human rights governance, but also how the global is connected to the local.
Exploring the Optional Protocol has demonstrated how imprinting a global governance rule system in both structure and governance relationships can begin to bridge the steps which separate international instruments from practices on the ground. This study highlights the articulation of a global human rights architecture in substantive obligations, as well as, and most radically, a series of procedural mechanisms which underpin a novel two-tier implementation apparatus. The OPCAT architecture aspires to globality. Not only does it assume structural form above the level of the nation state, political units within the architecture display significant autonomy and power and there is significant unbundling of functions among interacting actors across levels.
This article has sought to highlight opportunities for purposive action within the OPCAT architecture. Orchestration theory serves to frame the OPCAT strategic environment.
Descriptively, orchestration serves to clearly specify governance actors, with particular attention to questions of their location, focality, authority and resources. Analytically, it asserts agency as an important corollary to structural explanations for governance outcomes.
It identifies new authorising structures not only within IGO settings, but also extending to domestic political systems. Different from orthodox modes of governance which assume hierarchical control or the direct interface between principal and agent, orchestration in emphasising indirect channels of influence via third party intermediaries offers a useful addition to modes of human rights governance. In turn, orchestration offers a unified theory of governance -one capable of engaging with both a transnational and domestic politics of governance beyond command and control relationships.
A crucial condition for orchestration to occur in this study is limited state control and oversight of the agent. This is clearly particularly important in a regulatory domain which displays severe principal moral hazard -but is likely to be applicable to other issues areas also. The question of how political units are connected to centres of state authority emerges as central not only for assessing scope for strategic social construction beyond state agreement, but also for locating the limits of globality. State authority remains a prominent influence on the politics of implementation. By specifying the governance relationship between the SPT and NPMs in light of such considerations, this study has highlighted the potential for unintended consequences in the form of four orchestration scenarios. This exploratory mapping of admittedly highly stylised relations will be further problematised in a follow on empirical project on OPCAT implementation.
The installation of formal structures at the domestic level carries the promise of imprinting global standards onto domestic practice. However, function often does not follow form. This is a realm not simply of interlocking structure to use the rationalist parlance, but also governance relationships. Goal convergence and preference ordering -both ideational and material -and the ability of steward actors to generate broad based consensus around a global governance programme is likely crucial to the stability, durability, and performance of the OPCAT architecture. In other words, global governance as process requires careful attention to actors' motives, not only means and opportunity. Some observers have concluded that the inter-state legal human rights system is in terminal decline, declaring 'the endtimes of human rights'. 85 However, viewed from another vantage point, such claims may under-estimate the distributional power implications of these structures -especially once articulated into domestic politics.
